United States of America v. Shaffer by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-8-1994 
United States of America v. Shaffer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"United States of America v. Shaffer" (1994). 1994 Decisions. 126. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/126 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
           
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 __________________________ 
 
 Nos. 93-7508, 93-7509, 93-7549 & 93-7550 
 __________________________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
     Appellee/Cross-Appellant in Nos. 93-7549 
          & 93-7550 
 
 v. 
 
 FRANKLIN R. SHAFFER, 
 
     Appellant in Nos. 93-7508 & 93-7509 
          /Cross-Appellee 
 
 __________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. Nos. 91-00060, 92-00320) 
 __________________________ 
 
 Argued May 24, 1994 
 
 Before:  COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges, 
 and ACKERMAN, District Judge* 
 
 (Filed September 8, 1994) 
 
 __________________________ 
 
 
Matthew R. Gover (argued) 
Caldwell & Kearns 
3631 North Front Street 
Harrisburg, PA  17110 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
  FRANKLIN R. SHAFFER 
                     
*
  The Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, United States District Judge 
for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
  
 
 
David M. Barasch 
United States Attorney 
Martin C. Carlson (argued) 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Sally A. Lied 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Federal Building 
228 Walnut Street 
P.O. Box 11754 
Harrisburg, PA  17108 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
 __________________________ 
  
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________________ 
 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
  This case presents the issue of whether the bank fraud 
sentencing guidelines, which we earlier interpreted as requiring 
a sentencing court to calculate the amount of the victim's loss 
as it exists at the time of sentencing rather than at the time of 
the commission of the offense, permit a defendant convicted of 
kiting checks to significantly reduce his sentence by paying back 
all or a portion of the amount he absconded with during the 
commission of the offense.  In the particular case of a defendant 
who has violated the bank fraud statute through the act of kiting 
checks, we conclude that, in the absence of overriding facts 
dictating other treatment, the sentencing court must ordinarily 
calculate the amount of the loss as it exists at the time the 
  
crime was detected, rather than as it exists at the later time of 
sentencing.  Because the district court in this case sentenced 
the defendant by calculating the amount of the actual loss which 
resulted from the crime as it existed at the time of sentencing, 
we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. 
 
 I. 
  The facts giving rise to Franklin Shaffer's conviction 
and sentence are relatively simple and largely undisputed.  
Shaffer formerly led several engineering and construction firms 
which were engaged in large construction projects in central 
Pennsylvania.  During the summer of 1988, collections of accounts 
receivable fell significantly behind, resulting in a sizable cash 
shortfall for the companies.  After the companies' line of credit 
was canceled, Shaffer attempted to keep his businesses afloat by 
kiting checks for large sums of money between his personal bank 
accounts and the various business accounts.1  At the time he was 
                     
1
.  The check kiter opens an account at Bank A with a nominal 
deposit.  He then writes a check on that account for a large sum, 
such as $50,000.  The check kiter then opens an account at Bank B 
and deposits the $50,000 check from Bank A in that account.  At 
the time of deposit, the check is not supported by sufficient 
funds in the account at Bank A.  However, Bank B, unaware of this 
fact, gives the check kiter immediate credit on his account at 
Bank B.  During the several-day period that the check on Bank A 
is being processed for collection from that bank, the check kiter 
writes a $50,000 check on his account at Bank B and deposits it 
into his account at Bank A.  At the time of the deposit of that 
check, Bank A gives the check kiter immediate credit on his 
account there, and on the basis of that grant of credit pays the 
original $50,000 check when it is presented for collection. 
 By repeating this scheme, or some variation of it, the check 
kiter can use the $50,000 credit originally given by Bank B as an 
interest-free loan for an extended period of time.  In effect, 
  
writing checks, Shaffer did not have sufficient funds in the 
accounts to cover the check amounts. 
  In September, 1988, a bank officer reported the matter 
to federal authorities.  After an investigation, Shaffer was 
charged with executing and attempting to execute a check kiting 
scheme from July through September, 1988.  By the time the FBI 
investigated the matter, Shaffer had sufficient funds in all the 
accounts to cover all the checks.  For this reason, the United 
States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
recommended Shaffer as a possible candidate for pre-trial 
diversion.  By order dated August 21, 1991, the district court 
placed Shaffer on pre-trial diversion for twelve months, ordered 
him to pay the victim banks the interest each would have earned 
on the money Shaffer had borrowed through the check kiting 
scheme, and ordered him to perform community service. 
  While on pre-trial diversion, Shaffer again began 
kiting checks because of cash flow shortfalls in his various 
construction firms.  Bank officials notified the government of 
suspicious activity in Shaffer's accounts on August 19, 1992.  A 
motion was filed with the district court requesting that Shaffer 
be removed from pre-trial diversion.  The motion was granted and 
the FBI undertook an investigation.  Unlike the first time his 
check kiting was discovered, Shaffer was not able to cover all 
(..continued) 
the check kiter can take advantage of the several-day period 
required for the transmittal, processing, and payment of checks 
from accounts in different banks . . . ."  Williams v. United 
States, 458 U.S. 279, 281 n.1. 
 
  
the checks he had written.  Four of the five victim banks used by 
Shaffer in the check kiting scheme reported gross losses at the 
time of detection as follows: Fulton Bank--$40,371.46; Commerce 
Bank--$18,020.88; Dauphin Deposit Bank--$206,636.60; and CCNB--
$197,280.66.  The total loss was determined to be $462,309.60. 
  Shaffer was charged with two counts of bank fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, for the two separate check kiting 
incidents.  After plea bargain negotiations, Shaffer pleaded 
guilty to both counts on January 13, 1993.  As part of the plea 
agreement, Shaffer agreed to make restitution to the victim banks 
in an amount to be determined by the district court at a pre-
sentencing hearing.  At his arraignment, Shaffer requested a 
sentencing delay in order to allow him to get his business 
affairs in order and to give him sufficient time to attempt to 
make restitution to the victim banks. 
  The United States Probation Office prepared a pre-
sentence report pursuant to the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") which assessed a total offense level of 
17 against Shaffer.  The offense level was determined in the 
following manner: (1) a base level of 6 was assessed pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a); (2) an increase of 9 levels was added under 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(J) since the total amount of the loss to 
the victim banks exceeded $350,000 but was less than $500,000; 
and (3) an additional 2 level increase was made pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(B) because the crime involved a scheme to 
defraud more than one victim.  The pre-sentence report concluded 
  
that the applicable guideline sentence range was from 24 to 30 
months. 
  A sentencing hearing was held on July 16, 1993.  By 
this time, Shaffer had negotiated settlement agreements with 
three of the four victim banks.  Pursuant to these agreements, 
Fulton Bank had accepted a settlement of $20,000 in "full 
satisfaction" of its loss of $40,371.46; Commerce Bank had 
accepted $10,500 in "full satisfaction" of its loss of 
$18,020.88; and Dauphin Deposit Bank agreed to accept the 
conveyance of a parcel of real estate in Shreveport, Louisiana 
held by Shaffer in his retirement account, secured by a judgment 
against one of Shaffer's business corporations, and a promissory 
note in the sum of $84,000 from Shaffer in "full satisfaction" 
for its loss of $206,636.60.  No agreement was reached between 
Shaffer and the fourth victim bank, CCNB. 
  At the sentencing hearing, Shaffer objected to the 9 
level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(J).  He argued 
that no increase was warranted because he actually intended no 
loss to the victim banks at the time of the commission of the 
offense.  Based on the evidence presented, the district court 
agreed that Shaffer at all times intended to repay the amounts 
borrowed during the check kiting scheme through the collection of 
accounts receivable, and made a factual finding that Shaffer 
actually intended no permanent loss to the victim banks.  
Nevertheless, the district court disagreed that the loss was zero 
for all victim banks or the three banks which had entered into 
settlement agreements with Shaffer.  The district court concluded 
  
that the "actual loss" at the time of sentencing was the total 
loss of $462,309.60 less the amounts the three victim banks had 
agreed to accept in lieu of their initial losses pursuant to the 
settlement agreements.2 
  Since this reduced the loss for sentencing purposes to 
$347,809.60, the district court enhanced Shaffer's base level 
only by 8 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2F1.1(b)(1)(I).  In so 
doing, the district court rejected the government's position that 
"actual loss" in a check kiting bank fraud case is the initial 
loss of the victim banks at the time the fraud is detected, which 
should not be reduced by any subsequent settlement payments in 
the nature of restitution that the defendant makes.  The district 
court further granted Shaffer a 2 level base level reduction 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility.  
Premised on a base level of 14, the district court sentenced 
Shaffer to an eighteen month term of imprisonment, three years of 
supervised release, and ordered him to make restitution in full 
to CCNB and as agreed with the other victim banks.3 
                     
2
.  Thus, the district court agreed to reduce the total initial 
loss by $114,500, which was composed of the settlement agreement 
amounts of $10,500 for Commerce Bank, $20,000 for Fulton Bank, 
and $84,000 for Dauphin Deposit Bank. 
3
.  Shaffer filed a post-sentencing letter with the district 
court seeking a further 1 level base level reduction in his 
sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).  The district court 
agreed that a base level reduction of 3 levels was required for 
Shaffer's acceptance of responsibility, rather than the 2 base 
level reduction which was granted during sentencing.  Although 
the district court did not enter an order changing the sentence 
since it felt that 18 months of incarceration was appropriate and 
18 months was still well within the guideline range, the district 
court did instruct the probation office to adjust the guideline 
  
 
 II. 
  Shaffer filed a notice of appeal challenging his 
sentence on the theory that the district court overstated the 
amount of the victims' loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1).  
The government also filed a notice of appeal to challenge 
Shaffer's sentence taking the contrary view that the district 
court understated the amount of the victims' actual loss.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  These 
appeals involve a legal interpretation of the appropriate 
calculation of "loss" under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), over which we 
have plenary review.  United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 
936 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 III. 
  The question on appeal is whether to calculate the 
total amount of the victims' loss for purposes of sentencing a 
check kiter as it exists at the time the offense is detected or 
at the time of sentencing.  While the language of U.S.S.G. § 
2F1.1(b) itself, together with its commentary, does not directly 
address whether the loss calculation should be as it exists when 
the fraud is detected or at sentencing, the commentary does state 
that "the loss need not be determined with precision," U.S.S.G. § 
2F1.1 comment. (n.8).  Furthermore, the commentary states that 
(..continued) 
offense level to 13.  Neither party contests this adjustment on 
appeal. 
  
"if an intended loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict 
can be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than 
the actual loss."  Id. (n.7). 
  We have previously held that in the context of 
procuring a secured bank loan through fraudulent 
misrepresentation, fraud "loss" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) 
"is, in the first instance, the amount of money the victim has 
actually lost (estimated at the time of sentencing), not the 
potential loss as measured at the time of the crime."  United 
States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 536 (3d Cir. 1991).  The actual 
loss calculation, in a case such as Kopp, will reflect the 
deduction of the value of the collateral, pledged as security for 
the loan, from the loss sustained by the defrauded lender.  We 
recognized in Kopp that if actual loss as calculated at the time 
of sentencing understates the amount of loss the defendant 
intended to inflict, then the "loss" figure should be revised 
upward to the intended loss figure.  Id. 
  The present case does not involve an intended loss 
theory for the calculation of "loss" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2F1.1(b) because the district court made a finding of fact that 
Shaffer actually intended no permanent loss whatsoever.4  Citing 
                     
4
.  At oral argument, the government contended first that it was 
unnecessary to address whether the district court was clearly 
erroneous as to its factual finding concerning Shaffer's intent, 
and alternatively, that the finding was clearly erroneous.  Since 
we conclude that resolution of this case more appropriately turns 
on whether the district court settled on the appropriate actual 
loss figure by calculating the loss as it existed at the time of 
sentencing, rather than as it existed at the time the crime was 
detected, we need not address whether the district court's 
finding of fact was clearly erroneous. 
  
Kopp for authority, Shaffer argues that the district court should 
have determined that there was no loss to the three victim banks 
which entered into settlement agreements with Shaffer, which 
would have resulted in an increase of only 7 base levels pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(H) since the fourth victim bank, CCNB, 
had a total loss of just under $200,000.  Alternatively, Shaffer 
argues that the district court was correct in its loss 
calculation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) in that the loss was 
calculated as it existed at the time of sentencing, not as it 
existed at the time of the detection of the offense, and 
therefore his sentence should be affirmed.  The government argues 
that this case is distinguishable from Kopp because the crimes of 
kiting checks and the fraudulent procurement of a secured loan, 
while both bank frauds, are sufficiently distinct to warrant 
differing treatment under the Guidelines. 
  In Kopp, a case involving bank fraud where the borrower 
submitted false information in order to obtain a commercial real 
estate mortgage, we limited the loss calculation pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) to the higher of "actual loss" calculated at 
the time of sentencing or the amount of loss the borrower 
actually intended.  951 F.2d at 527-36.  In that case, we held 
that the actual loss is that which exists at the time of 
sentencing, not at the time the fraudulent act was committed, 
because the total amount of the loan without a reduction for the 
actual or estimated value of the collateral pledged to the bank 
would overstate the victim bank's actual loss.  See id. at 528-
30.  Thus, we determined that calculation of the victim's actual 
  
loss at the time of sentencing would more accurately reflect the 
defendant's culpability for sentencing purposes. 
  Subsequently, we have indicated that the Kopp holding 
does not provide a rule that should be followed for all types of 
bank fraud convictions.  For instance, where a bank officer was 
convicted of bank fraud for using his position for his personal 
benefit by conditioning loan approval on the borrower using 
contractors in which he owned an interest, we determined that 
actual loss was the total amount of the contracts received by the 
related contractors, rather than the net gain or profit to these 
companies as calculated or estimated at the time of sentencing.  
United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 936-38 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Thus, we distinguished Kopp because the type of bank fraud at 
issue in Badaracco was more similar to an embezzlement crime, 
where the loss is calculated as gross gain, rather than a secured 
loan crime where the defendant actually pledges something of 
value, the collateral, which will reduce the amount of the victim 
bank's loss below the face value of the loan.  See 954 F.2d at 
937-38. 
  We stated in Badaracco that "[a]lthough section 2F1.1 
is applicable to a wide variety of fraud schemes, the sentencing 
judge is entitled, probably compelled, to evaluate the size of 
the loss based on the particular offense."  Id. at 937.  We 
believe that check kiting crimes, because of their particular 
nature, are crimes where the district court must calculate the 
victim's actual loss as it exists at the time the offense is 
detected rather than as it exists at the time of sentencing.  Cf. 
  
United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1406-07 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(sentencing court not obliged to reduce amount of wire fraud loss 
by speculative value of personal guaranties given at time of 
commission of offense).  We come to this conclusion for several 
reasons. 
  First, the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 indicates 
that loss valuation should be made in accordance with the 
valuation of theft loss pursuant to the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1.  U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comment. (n.7).  "As in theft cases, 
loss is the value of the money, property, or services unlawfully 
taken."  Id.  In a check kiting scheme, where the offender writes 
bad checks to "temporarily . . . obtain credit," Black's Law 
Dictionary 238 (6th ed. 1990), the amount of money owed to the 
victim banks at the time the kite is detected is the value of the 
money unlawfully taken by the defendant.  In effect, the gross 
amount of the kite at the time of detection, less any other 
collected funds the defendant has on deposit with the bank at 
that time and any other offsets that the bank can immediately 
apply against the overdraft (including immediate repayments), is 
the loss to the victim bank. 
  Second, we do not believe that most check kiting frauds 
are sufficiently analogous to secured loan frauds to require, as 
we held in Kopp, that the actual loss determination be made as 
the loss exists at the time of sentencing rather than at the time 
of detection.  Although both of these types of bank fraud involve 
fraudulently obtained loans, the similarities end there.  Secured 
loan frauds include an aspect that is ordinarily entirely absent 
  
from a check kiting scheme--namely collateral, which while 
probably insufficient to protect the victim bank completely 
against risk of loss, usually provides some recovery against the 
loan amount.  By its very nature, the crime of kiting checks 
ordinarily involves the borrowing of funds without authorization 
from the bank and without the offender providing any security to 
protect the bank against risk of loss.  This distinction warrants 
treating perpetrators of check kiting loan frauds in most cases 
differently from perpetrators of secured loan frauds for 
sentencing purposes. 
  Furthermore, we do not believe that calculating check 
kiting fraud loss at the time of detection is contrary to the 
commentary contained in the Sentencing Guidelines.  The 
Sentencing Guidelines have been clarified to make explicit the 
rule we announced in Kopp as applicable to secured loan frauds, 
but not unsecured loan frauds like check kiting.  The Guidelines 
commentary now states in relevant part: 
 In fraudulent loan application cases . . ., the loss is the 
actual loss to the victim (or if the loss has not yet come 
about, the expected loss).  For example, if a defendant 
fraudulently obtains a loan by misrepresenting the value of 
his assets, the loss is the amount of the loan not repaid at 
the time the offense is discovered, reduced by the amount 
the lending institution has recovered (or can expect to 
recover) from any assets pledged to secure the loan. 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comment. (n.7(b)).  The Sentencing Guidelines 
apparently limit this wait-and-see approach to calculating actual 
loss to secured loans because with unsecured loans, like those 
which sometimes result when check kiting schemes are detected, 
  
any recovery is entirely speculative.5  Nevertheless, to the 
extent the Guidelines commentary indicates that in secured loan 
frauds the actual loss should be reduced by the amount of money 
immediately repaid by the offender at the time of discovery, the 
same is true of check kiting frauds. 
  Moreover, the weight of authority, while sparse, 
supports our conclusion that for purposes of sentencing a 
defendant who has perpetrated a bank fraud by kiting checks, 
actual loss should be calculated as it exists at the time of 
detection rather than at the time of sentencing.  Likening check 
kiting frauds more to simple theft than secured loan 
transactions, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted 
the position we adhere to today.  United States v. Frydenlund, 
990 F.2d 822, 825-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. 
Ct. 192 (1993).  Other courts of appeals have held that the 
fortuity of the defendant paying full restitution to the victim 
banks after the time when the check kiting fraud was detected 
does not warrant a downward departure on the sentence for 
acceptance of responsibility.  United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 
                     
5
.  We reject the attempt made by Shaffer in this appeal to liken 
his crime more to a secured loan fraud than a theft because he 
was the principal of several businesses which had a large amount 
of accounts receivable outstanding during the period of the kite.  
The record reveals that at the time of the second check kite, 
which resulted in loss to the four victim banks, Shaffer's 
various business interests also had a significant outstanding 
loan from an individual named "Cochrane" which was secured with 
the business receivables.  See App. at 174, 185 (testimony of 
Shaffer). 
  
318, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d 
1336, 1340-41 (4th Cir. 1989). 
  Finally, we, like the district court, are troubled by 
the outcome which would result if actual loss is calculated as it 
exists at the time of sentencing rather than at the time of 
detection.  We agree with the sentiment, stated by the district 
court at sentencing, that a reduction of sentence because of a 
last minute payment of restitution would unfairly discriminate in 
favor of those with greater financial resources.6  We are also 
concerned that permitting such a reduction in sentence might 
encourage the use of undue pressure by a defendant to induce the 
victim bank into settling for payment of only a portion of the 
amount it has lost.  In sum, it is a hallmark of our sentencing 
scheme that criminal defendants who have committed identical 
crimes, and who have the exact same culpability, should be 
                     
6
.  The district court stated the following at sentencing: 
 
    As a final note, I should add that the court is troubled 
by the outcome in this case.  The [c]ourt recognizes that 
the prospect of a potentially reduced sentence acts as a 
carrot to a defendant sparing that individual to make 
speedier or more adequate restitution than he or she might 
otherwise do benefiting the victims of his or her crime.  
However, the [c]ourt sees a great danger in allowing an 
individual to buy his or her way out of jail time. 
 
    Unfortunately, this is what a reduction of sentence in a 
last minute payment of restitution amounts to.  Such a 
policy I think unfairly discriminates in favor of those with 
greater financial resources.  I believe in light of the 
cases and in light of the way the Third Circuit has spoken, 
it is the only outcome this [c]ourt can conclude is 
appropriate for this case. 
 
App. at 157-58. 
  
treated equally at sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) 
even though one has the means through business or personal 
relations to make restitution to the victim banks after he has 
been convicted, while the other does not. 
 
 IV. 
  We conclude that the district court erred in 
calculating the victims' loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) 
from this check kiting fraud as it existed at the time of 
sentencing rather than as it existed at the time of detection.  
Thus, we will vacate Shaffer's sentence and remand for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
United States v. Shaffer, Nos. 93-7508/7549 
ACKERMAN, District Judge, concurring in the judgment: 
 I agree with the majority's conclusion that the check-kiting 
scheme involved in this case is more akin to theft than to loan 
fraud.  I also believe that this distinction makes Kopp 
inapplicable.       
 I must part company, however, with the majority's treatment 
of Kopp.  According to the majority, the rule we announced in 
Kopp -- that the amount of the loss is the actual loss estimated 
at the time of sentencing (unless the intended loss is higher) -- 
only applies to fraudulently obtained loans secured by 
collateral.  In its view, Kopp is distinguishable from the 
instant case in large part because Shaffer did not fraudulently 
obtain a loan that was secured by collateral. 
  
 The fact of collateral, however, is peripheral to our 
analysis in Kopp.  Rather, Kopp focuses on distinguishing between 
the various levels of culpability involved in different types of 
fraud.  Specifically, when a fraud consists solely of 
misrepresentations designed to secure a contract, but the 
defendant has no intention of reneging on the contract, that 
fraud must be treated differently from a garden-variety fraud 
case.  The latter often is indistinguishable from theft; the 
former is not.  As we said in Kopp itself, "some fraud involves 
an intent to walk away with the full amount fraudulently 
obtained, while other fraud is committed to obtain a contract the 
fraud perpetrator intends to perform."  Kopp, 951 F.2d at 529.  
In holding as we did, we recognized the irrationality of 
"apply[ing] the same sentence against a performing contractor who 
lied on its application as against 'a con artist who intended to 
winkle $142,400 . . . from a senile old lady.'"  Id. at 532 
(citing United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 
1991)).  This also is the principle articulated by the cases we 
relied on in Kopp.  See Schneider, 930 F.2d 555 (when defendants 
fraudulently procured government contracts but fully intended to 
perform the contracts, court declined to compute the loss as the 
face amount of contracts obtained); United States v. Whitehead, 
912 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1990) (when defendant presented 
fraudulent documents to obtain an option to purchase a home, 
court declined to value the loss as the value of the home); 
United States v. Hughes, 775 F.Supp. 348 (E.D.Cal. 1991) (when 
defendant conspired to present false loan applications to buy 
  
three homes but had no intention of defaulting on the loans, and 
in fact paid back two of the loans involved, court declined to 
compute loss as value of homes). 
 I respectfully suggest that the majority misses this 
distinction by focusing on collateral.  Kopp is inapplicable to 
this case not because Shaffer's "loan" was unsecured, but because 
Shaffer's check-kiting scheme simply is not analogous to the 
crime of "a performing contractor who lied on its application."  
Check-kiting is more akin to theft.  For that reason, the case  
  
falls outside the scope of Kopp, and I join my colleagues in 
vacating Shaffer's sentence and remanding the matter for 
resentencing. 
